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Abstract
This paper puts forward a characterization of the structural features of the economic system
relevant to the monetary-policy decisions of the European Central Bank. The econometric
analysis adopts a parsimonious VAR representation of three key macroeconomic variables
(interest rates, prices and GDP) aggregated across countries to obtain area-wide time series.
The exogenous disturbances driving the multivariate system are identified imposing restrictions
based on economic theory. The dynamic properties of the estimated models are analyzed and
compared with the available evidence for the US. The robustness of this characterization is
corroborated by the estimates from a different sample period and by the findings from an
alternative model that singles out German monetary policy in view of its anchor role within the
ERM.ECB Working Paper No. 2 • May 1999 1
1 Introduction
What are the effects on prices and output of a one-percentage-point change in the short-term
interest rate? How long do these effects take to materialize fully? What is the shape of the
response of these and other key macroeconomic variables to a monetary-policy shock? In short,
what does monetary policy do? Without an answer to these questions — even an approximate
one, offering ball-park figures when more precise and reliable estimates are not available — no
fruitful debate can take place on what monetary policy should do — in general, and at certain
critical junctures.
The long and rapid succession of attempts to address these difficult issues might not have
mitigated the controversy on the appropriate characterization of the effects of monetary policy.
However, it has produced a substantive body of information about the key macroeconomic
relationships not only for the US — the economy that has been studied most — but also for
several industrialized countries, including the European ones. In contrast, little is known about
the features of the new, “composite” economic system brought about by the inception of
Monetary Union despite the fact that Eurosystem
1 is already up and running.
This paper starts filling the gap by providing a first characterization of the structural properties
of the euro area, considering it as a single, Union-wide, economic system, rather than the
collection of the participating countries. The choice of the Union-wide approach is motivated by
the belief that the knowledge of the way macroeconomic shocks impinge on the Union as a
whole is, unavoidably, the starting point for any assessment of the appropriate monetary policy
stance that the Eurosystem should adopt in the pursuit of its objectives.
The paper is organized as follows. Next Section discusses the methodological issues that arise in
applying the VAR approach to a “synthetic” economic system consisting of macroeconomic
variables aggregated across countries. Section 3 provides a framework for the interpretation of
the empirical results, describing the two main empirical exercises presented in the model.
Sections 4 and 5 respectively deal with the issues involved in the structural identification and the
estimation of the VAR system. Section 6 presents the results of the benchmark model, providing
a structured representation of the key features of the Union-wide economic system that are
compared with the characteristics of the US and the major European countries. Section 7
assesses the robustness of the results from the benchmark model considering another
specification of the VAR system that singles out Germany in view of its special role within the
ERM. Section 8 concludes.
2 The union-wide approach
The estimation of identified-VAR systems to represent macroeconomic time series and
characterize their key structural features is always confronted with difficult methodological
issues, particularly as regards the choice of the identifying restrictions (see Leeper et al., 1996,
for a review) and the treatment of cointegration (Sims et al., 1990). In addition to these standard
issues, addressed later in the paper, the investigation of the properties of the Union-wide
economic system on the basis of macroeconomic variables aggregated across countries faces a
number of peculiar issues that have to be discussed before moving to the econometric analysis.
1 The Eurosystem includes the ECB and the 11 National central banks of the countries that have adopted the euro in 1999.ECB Working Paper No. 2 • May 1999 2
The first issue stems from the differences in the economic structure, and hence in the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy, across European countries. Such asymmetries are
well-known to be sizable, regard both the extent and the timing of the propagation of
macroeconomic shocks, including those originating from monetary policy actions (BIS, 1994,
1995), and are bound to play a major role in shaping the single monetary policy. As Dornbusch
et al. (1997) forcefully argue, structural asymmetries imply that the cost of a disinflation episode
could fall disproportionately on a few member countries posing a major challenge to the
Eurosystem as public opinion may find it difficult to the accept the circumstance. Strains may
surface within the decision-making body of the Eurosystem — the Governing Council, that
consists of the governors of the central banks of the European countries participating in
Monetary Union and the members of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank (ECB)
— if the governors attach more importance to developments in their home country than to
those in the Union as a whole. Moreover, as shown in Monticelli (1997), heterogeneity in
economic structures has a bearing on monetary policy even if every member of the Governing
Council entertains the same objectives are defined with reference to the Union as a whole, since
it affects the transmission of shocks within and across countries, thereby influencing their impact
on Union-wide macroeconomic variables.
The importance of structural asymmetries across countries participating in Monetary Union
could be viewed as implying that econometric analyses using Union-wide macroeconomic data
are inadequate on two scores. Doubts may be cast on the policy relevance of single, average
macroeconomic relationships for the whole Union when differences across countries have so
pervasive implications. Moreover, econometric estimates might be expected to be poor as a
result of the bias following the imposition of invalid restrictions on the coefficients that is implicit
in the process of data aggregation across countries and estimation of single supranational
equations.
Skepticism on the usefulness of the Union-wide approach to address issues pertaining to the
conduct of the single monetary policy is drastically attenuated when it is recalled that the choices
of the Eurosystem will affect the liquidity conditions in all the countries participating in the Union
with no possibility for regional differentiation. TARGET — the European payments system — brings
about a unified European money market where intra-day arbitrage operations equalize the
short-term interest rate in euro across the Union. Therefore, changes in the setting of
instruments at the disposal of the Eurosystem will impart a single, Union-wide impulse triggering
a response in Union-wide price and quantities. Even though the Union-wide impact is the result
of differentiated national responses (that in turn might have an influence on the policy advocated
by the various members of the decision-making bodies of the Eurosystem), the features of the
Union-wide responses are an indispensable point of reference in the assessment of the single
monetary policy.
As regards the econometric issue, the possible — and indeed likely — bias stemming from
aggregation across countries of national behavioral equations characterized by different
parameters, if not functional forms altogether, has to be weighed against the advantages of
estimating aggregate, euro-wide equations. In addition to the heuristic expedience for the
analysis of the developments of the Union as a whole, Union-wide relationships might provide an
effective tool to address the specification bias that affects national specifications failing to
account for the impact of foreign variables and correlation of shocks between countries as
tightly integrated as European ones. The high level of collinearity often encountered between
domestic and foreign variables as well as the difficulty in identifying the relevant foreign variables
explain why the rapid progress in international integration has not been accompanied by theECB Working Paper No. 2 • May 1999 3
diffusion of foreign variables as regressors in national macroeconomic relationships,
notwithstanding the instability that has plagued several of the them in various countries.
The estimation of area-wide equations for groups of integrated countries cannot certainly be
advocated as an infallible cure for the specification problems of national equations. However, as
Pesaran et al. (1989) formally demonstrate, the estimation of aggregate equations is not
necessarily an inferior choice from an econometric point of view because the bias associated
with aggregation might be small and more than compensated by the effective remedy provided
to the specification bias that affects several national equations as a result of the omission of
relevant, “within-the-area” foreign variables. Moreover, very encouraging results have been
obtained by several studies that have estimated area-wide equations for groups of European
countries, particularly as regards the demand for money — a relationship that is most likely to
be affected by “within-the-area” international spillovers (for a discussion of these findings see
Monticelli and Papi, 1996; Browne et al., 1997).
Another issue relevant for the empirical inquiry of this paper is the extraordinary force of the
Lucas critique in this particular instance. All econometric exercises are intrinsically liable to the
possibility that their good in-sample performance is belied by a very poor post-sample
performance because of changes in the underlying economic behavior, possibly as a result of new
economic policies confronting the private sector. As the risk is in general ineluctable, awareness
of it suggests great caution in extending econometric results to conditions where values of the
variables or the parameters are, or can be expected to be, very different from the one observed
in the sample.
In the case at hand, however, the very event which provides the motivation for the empirical
analysis — the inception of Monetary Union — will involve a modification of the monetary
regime so radical, sizable and wide-ranging as to have very few, if any, comparable precedents in
economic history. Moreover, the introduction of the euro is bound to have a quicker and
deeper impact on the functioning of financial markets and the behavior of financial intermediaries
— the two elements of the economic structure that contribute most to shaping the extent and
timing of the transmission of impulses originating from monetary policy to price variables and
economic activity. The only convincing rebuttal to this critique is that, however poor and
unreliable, information obtained from Union-wide econometric analysis is still more informative
than sheer guessing. And certainly more helpful than the alternative of waiting for the availability
of sufficiently long, actual (as opposed to constructed from national variables) Union-wide time
series before attempting any econometric exploration of what the single monetary policy does.
3 A reference model
Since the path-breaking contributions of Blanchard and Watson (1986), Bernanke (1986) and
Blanchard and Quah (1989), several alternative identification schemes have been put forward to
provide structure to the innovations of VAR systems and interpret them with reference to a
theoretical framework. This avenue of research, however, has rekindled the discussion on the
appropriate interpretation of the business cycle within the VAR approach, given that the number
of restrictions that can be drawn from the consensus core of economic theory is generally
insufficient to identify a system even of small dimensions. Notwithstanding the controversy, this
line of research provides a very useful disciplinary device to the debate on empirical
macroeconomics in that it requires the unambiguous specification of the hypotheses maintained
to identify the different kinds of disturbance.ECB Working Paper No. 2 • May 1999 4
Since the present analysis aims at providing an assessment of the structural features of the
Union-wide economic system following the VAR approach (the alternative of an area-wide
disaggregated macroeconometric model is pursued, for example, by Fagan and Henry, 1996), a
consensus framework for the identification of the structural shocks would have been preferable.
Unfortunately, even with a small number of variables, this option was not available and the
reference model is, necessarily, at least in part controversial. The choice has fallen on the
standard version of the aggregate supply/aggregate demand (AS/AD) framework, that assumes
the presence of price and wage rigidities in the short run, while positing the neutrality of money
in the long run. Although still lacking widely-accepted underpinnings in utility- and profit-
maximizing behavior, this framework remains a central point of reference for policy makers and
market participants since it offers a familiar characterization of the macroeconomic issues as a
result of its lasting primacy in textbooks.
The AS/AD approach also stands as a convenient tool to couch the competing views of the main
schools in macroeconomic thought as they can be encompassed by different values of the key
elasticities of the equations of the model. Moreover, from an empirical point of view, Galí (1992)
has shown that the AS/AD framework can deliver an effective stylized characterization of the
postwar business cycles in the US, while Gerlach and Smets (1995) have usefully adopted it to
identify monetary and real shocks in the G-7 countries.
For these reasons, the empirical analysis of the Union-wide economic system is based on the
following theoretical framework cast in terms of a two-country Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch
model:
[1a]  v i y p m - - = - b a * * * * * v i y p m - - = - b a [LM]
[1b]  ( ) ( ) u y p p s p E i y y + + + - + D - - = + * * 1 g h d [IS]
( ) ( ) * * * * * * 1 u y p p s p E i y y + + + - - D - - = + g h d
[1c] ( ) w y p p - + D = D - j 1 ( ) * * * * 1 w y p p - + D = D - j [Phillips curve]
[1d] [] ms v i i - ￿ = [] * * * ms v i i - ￿ = [Reaction function]
[1e] z i i s E - - = D + * 1 [UIP]
[1f] m + + = s p p * [Stochastic PPP]
The notation is standard, with m standing for the log of the nominal money stock; y for the log
of real output; p for the log of its price; i for the nominal interest rate; s for the exchange rate
and E  for the expectations operator; a star denotes foreign variables and a stochastic
disturbance is added to each equation.
From the Union-wide standpoint, the key hypothesis embodied in the model is that the two
countries are identical, both in size and parameter values, thus assuming that the transmission
and propagation mechanisms of a shock are the same in the two economies. The available cross-
country evidence suggests that this assumption is not precisely correct for countries
participating in EMU. However, the Union-wide approach adopted in the empirical analysis
maintains that the hypothesis of identical economic structures can be regarded as a reasonable
approximation, at least to characterize the key features of the Union-wide system.ECB Working Paper No. 2 • May 1999 5
Accepting the assumption of identical parameter values, equations [1b] and [1c], can be
aggregated into:
[2a]  ( )
A A A A A A u y p E i y y + + D - - = + g d 1
[2b]  ( )
A A A A w y p p - + D = D - j 1








A + = ,  x "
The above equations provide the basis for the identification of Union-wide demand and supply
shocks in the empirical exercise. If all the shocks are of a symmetric nature, this approach entails
no loss of information. Conversely, when shocks are asymmetric, the approach does not allow
the identification of country-specific effects. Even in this case, however, the dynamic
characteristics of the Union-wide economy are identified correctly, conditionally on the
assumption that the transmission mechanisms is equal across countries.
Aggregating equations [1a] and [1d], respectively, provides Union-wide relationships that
complete the model describing both sides of the money market. In particular, the Union-wide
monetary policy reaction function can be written as:
[2c] [] ) ( . * ms ms
A v v f i + - =
This equation assumes that the interest rate is set by the central bank responding to the
developments in Union-wide variables in the pursuit of Union-wide objectives. Although this
characterization is the appropriate benchmark for the monetary regime prevailing in EMU, it
may be regarded as inadequate with reference to the sample period of the empirical analysis. In
particular, the objective of exchange rate stability within the ERM has played an important role in
the determination of monetary policy, particularly at times of turbulence in foreign exchange
market. The 1992-93 crisis is the obvious example that springs to mind.
In order to assess the robustness of the empirical results obtained from the model described by
equations [2a-c], we therefore consider an alternative specification which relaxes the assumption
of a common Union-wide monetary shock and allows for the influence of the exchange rate in
the determination of monetary policy. In the wake of the vast literature (see, e.g., Giovannini and
Giavazzi, 1989) that assigns Germany the role of anchor within the ERM, the alternative scheme
of interest-rate determination considers that Germany (denoted by the country with starred
variables) sets its monetary policy without considering exchange rate developments with the
ERM. Conversely, the other ERM countries (aggregated into a single bloc to ensure the
tractability of the model) set the interest rate on the basis of Germany’s interest rate and
exchange rate movements vis-à-vis the Deutsch mark.
[2c’] [ ] ms v s i i i - = *, [] * . * * ms v i i - =
For this extension to be feasible, however, we need to the minimum the empirical description of
the AS/AD model. We thus abstract from the complication of distinguishing between demand
and supply in the money market and only investigate the propagation of monetary shocks to
prices and output. In order to interpret monetary shocks as money supply shocks, we need toECB Working Paper No. 2 • May 1999 6
make the additional hypothesis that central banks use a short-term interest rate as the policy
instrument and that they are able to control such rate precisely enough to render slippages
negligible. This appears to be a realistic assumption for the countries included in the analysis.
To summarise, our main specification includes three variables: area-wide output, prices and
interest rates. The alternative specification, allowing for the influence of the exchange rate for
the determination of monetary policy, includes five variables: area-wide income and prices,
German short-term interest rates, short-term interest rate differential between the remaining
EMU countries and Germany, a weighted average of the exchange rate of the former countries’
currencies vis-à-vis the Deutsch mark.
In both empirical specifications, we implicitly assume that all possible sorts of aggregate demand
(or supply) shocks have similar effects on output, prices and interest rates. This appears to be a
reasonable assumption to make, since a more detailed break down of aggregate demand (and
supply) shocks would probably prove too ambitious at the aggregate Union-wide level.
4 The union-wide macroeconomic variables
This Section discusses a number of further issues that need to be addressed before estimation
4.1 Aggregation method
Since the exchange rate is not constant in the available sample, aggregation of national time
series into area-wide data is not straightforward. Two general classes of methods are available:
current exchange rates or fixed conversion rates. No broad consensus has yet been reached
even on the choice between these two methodologies (see Monticelli and Papi, 1996 for a
general discussion). As a reference, Figure 1 shows the rate of growth of the area-wide GDP
obtained according to different aggregation methods.
On the one hand, current exchange rates permit an obvious interpretation from an economic
standpoint as they are the market yardstick (and indeed the only one actually available to
economic agents) to convert income and assets into effective spending power across borders.
On the other hand, using market exchange rates to convert a given time series amounts to
‘distorting’ its dynamics: the rate of growth, the standard deviation and in general all the
moments, are affected by movements in the exchange rate used for the conversion, thereby
introducing a large number of spurious shocks in the series.
Resorting to fixed exchange rates avoids this distortion but amounts to proceed ‘as if’ the
exchange rate between the European currencies did not vary — a tenet clearly at odds with
experience. However, from the point of view of the characterization of the Union-wide
economy, the investigation of the structural relationship between macroeconomic variables for
given exchange rate has a special appeal in that it amounts to assuming that the exchange rate is
not a relevant variable — a sensible assumption to underpin a benchmark for the developments
of the variables once the monetary union is established.
Given that neither of the previous methods appears completely satisfactory, in our empirical
work we use a (geometric) weighted average of national outputs, with weights given by relative
output sizes in 1993 (at PPP exchange rates). Since weighted averaging is the only option
available to aggregate price and interest rate series, this methodology has the advantage of being
consistent across the variables used in our empirical analysis. Moreover, it is consistent with theECB Working Paper No. 2 • May 1999 7
reference theoretical model, where aggregate data are also obtained through geometric
averages.
4.2 Key features of Union-wide data
The nominal short-term interest rate, the real interest rate, the inflation rate and the rate of
growth of GDP for the European economy are reported in Figure 2. Visual inspection is
sufficient to point to the drastic fall of inflation during the eighties, concomitant with a high level
of the real interest rate with respect to the rate of growth — a recurrent feature in the
experience of disinflation.
Some of the variables display a possibly non-stationary behavior. The execution of unit-root
tests requires a choice on whether a constant and a trend should be included in the relevant
OLS regressions. The marked fall of both inflation and the short-term nominal interest rate
during the sample period suggest the specification with a trend for all variables.
The results of unit-root tests are reported in Table 1. While GDP can more safely be
considered I(1), the evidence for the nominal interest rate and, especially, prices is mixed. In the
latter case, the evidence of non-stationarity seems stronger for the inflation rate than for the
price level itself. However, the real interest rate also appears non-stationary, contradicting the
priors from the standard theoretical models of economic growth. Although, as usual, the
evidence is not clear-cut, the variables benchmark system {dy
A, i
A, dp
A} are taken to be stationary.
5 Estimation
5.1 Specification
Although the results from standard information criteria obtained in preliminary investigations
point to specifications with one or two lags for the VAR, the selected lag-length for the VAR is 5
both in order to completely eliminate autoregression from the residuals and to be consistent
with the widely-accepted prior that monetary policy impulses take a relatively long time to
produce effects, if any, on the real economy.
Although GDP and inflation series are seasonally adjusted, seasonal dummies have been added in
the specification in order to take into account any possible remaining seasonal component.
5.2 Sample period, structural breaks and German reunification
Since consistent data are available only from 1976, the need for a sufficient number of lags led to
use the full available sample for estimation: from 78q1 to 97q4. Although this period is not long
in comparison with standard analyses on the US, it has nonetheless witnessed important changes
for European economies, from the inception of the ERM to its crisis in 1992-93 and the final
decision about EMU.
On the one hand, despite these changes, a fundamental continuity can be traced in behaviour
and policies, especially for monetary policies that have been constantly concerned with the
stability of intra-EU exchange rates, as revealed by the ERM precursor (the “Snake”) before
1979 and by the behavior of the Italian interest short-term rates after the ERM crisis. Moreover,
many empirical studies for Europe use a sample period starting in the late seventies (see, e.g.,
Gerlach and Smets; 1995, Andrés et al.; 1997, Bruneau and De Bandt, 1998). On the other hand,
developments in the ERM clearly point to two major events that might be associated withECB Working Paper No. 2 • May 1999 8
parameter instability: the first quarter in 1987, when the ‘last’ ERM realignments occurred, and
the 1992-93 crisis.
Investigating the issue formally through Chow tests with reference to those dates fails to reject
the null hypothesis of paramenter stability. However, the power of the tests may be weakend by
the reliance on the assumption that the dates of the possible structural breaks are known (see
Andrews, 1993, and Hansen, 1992), and by the fact that, for the 1987 test, the estimation period
is shorter than the forecast period. For this reason, the analysis was complemented with a series
of one-step ahead Chow tests, whose results, for the last part of the sample, are qualitatively
different since they corroborate the hypothesis of possible breaks in the nineties for the interest
rate and the inflation equations.
Since not enough data are available to split the sample in 1992 and carry out a separate
estimation, the following route is taken. The model is first estimated over the whole sample,
conditional on the hypothesis of no parameter change. The robustness of the results is then
checked re-estimating the system over a sample that ends in 91q4. The conclusions that can be
drawn from these estimates broadly match the findings of the longer sample, supporting the
reliability of the characterization of the Union-wide economy discussed in the next Section. The
main differentiating feature of impulse responses for the shorter sample is a much stronger
impact of aggregate supply shocks on inflation and thus on interest rates (Figure 4).
Finally, it has to be stressed that the jump in German output due to the reunification has been
smoothed out from GDP data in our main estimation exercise. This research strategy allows us
to avoid the risk that our estimates be driven by a single predominant shock. We investigate the
robustness of our findings to the “inclusion” of German reunification in the data in a separate
regression. This exercise also provides us an indication of the goodness of fit of our identifying
restrictions. Assuming that the German reunification epitomises a supply shock, our impulse
responses to aggregate demand and money supply shocks should remain largely unchanged
whether the reunification is or is not present in the data; only the impulse responses to supply
shocks should vary. This is indeed shown to be the case in the comparison presented in figure 5.
5.3 Identification of a structural VAR
The model described in the previous Section provides the framework to identify the VAR system
through a combination of short and long run restrictions, as in Galí (1992) and Gerlach and
Smets (1995). The benchmark system includes three area-wide variables — the log-change in
GDP (dy
A), the nominal 3-month interest rate (i
A) and the inflation rate (dp
A) — and three
exogenous driving forces — u, w, and vms, the innovations in spending (IS), aggregate supply
(Phillips curve) and the monetary shock that, as argued above, can be interpreted as a shock to
interest rate setting, mainly of a policy nature.
Define the vector of variables included in the VAR system as  t x . If  t x  is covariance stationary it
will have a Wold moving average representation of the form
[3] ( ) t t L A x ˛ =
where L is a lag operator, A(L) is a polynomial matrix in L and  t ˛  is a vector of innovations in
the elements of xt.
Moreover, xt also has a moving average representation of the formECB Working Paper No. 2 • May 1999 9
[4] ( ) t t e L B x =
where  t e  is a vector of serially uncorrelated structural residuals.
If the vector of innovations is a linear combination of the structural residuals, i.e. if  t t Ce = ˛ ,
with C being a nxn matrix, then
( ) ( ) t t t e L C Ce L A x = = , and thus ( ) ( ) L B C L A =
These conditions permit to retrieve the structural representation [4] from the estimates of the
reduced-form representation [3], provided that C is full rank. Zero restrictions on the elements
of the C matrix are equivalent to imposing that the impact effect of a given shock on a certain
variable is null, while long-run (neutrality or homogeneity) constrains are imposed setting to
zero the appropriate elements of C(1).
In line with the objective of a structured representation of the key features of the Union-wide
economic system, the first set of restrictions adopted is the orthogonality condition among the
structural shocks of the benchmark defined in the previous section. In addition, shocks to real
aggregate demand and monetary shocks are assumed to have no effects on output in the long
run, consistently with the widely-shared view that only technological shocks can have a lasting
influence on economic growth. To achieve identification, reference is made to a customary and
possibly uncontroversial “minimum delay restriction”: monetary shocks are assumed not to have
any contemporaneous effect on output, on the premise that at least three months are necessary
for monetary shocks to impinge on economic activity.
The latter condition is often coupled with another one, prescribing the same minimum delay for
the impact of monetary shocks on prices. We do not adopt this assumption in the identification
of our main 3-variable model, because we want to allow for possibly “fast” reactions of prices to
monetary shocks via an exchange rate channel. A given change in the average euro area interest
rate could in fact be associated with different interest rate changes in different countries, thus
triggering potential variations of the exchange rate which could be reflected into import/export
prices. Moreover, the identifying assumption we adopt ensures full compatibility with the results
obtained by Gerlach and Smets (1995), which are based exactly on the same structuralisation.
Recalling that the system variables are ordered as  t x =[dy
A, i
A, dp
A], the identifying assumptions
discussed above can be expressed in terms of zero restrictions on the coefficients of the C the
() 1 C  matrices of the VAR model, respectively as c12(1)=c13(1)=c12=0.
 2
As a further robustness check, however, we also perform the structural analysis with a different
identification scheme. As in the main scheme, we impose zero long run effects of aggregate
demand shocks on output; we then identify monetary shocks by imposing the minimum delay
restriction on both prices and output. In terms of the C matrix, this amounts to setting
c13(1)=c12=c32=0. The resulting impulse responses, that appear remarkably similar to those
obtained under the main identification scheme, are included in Figure 3.
A final word of caution appears warranted concerning the identification of monetary policy
shocks in the structural VAR literature. In the theoretical monetary economics literature, it is
2 The implementation of identifying restrictions follows the procedure by Amisano and Giannini (1998), while maximum likelihood
estimation is performed using the RATS routine SVAR.SRC, by A. Lanzarotti and M. Seghellini.ECB Working Paper No. 2 • May 1999 10
customary to identify monetary policy with the “rule” followed by a given central bank when
reacting to macroeconomic shocks. Accordingly, the effects of monetary policy are interpreted
as the changes, with respect to a hypothetical unchanged-policy scenario, caused in the
behaviour of macroeconomic variables by the reaction of monetary policy to the occurrence of
shocks. This interpretation of the effects of monetary policy requires that the researcher is
capable to isolate the direct effects of a given macroeconomic shock from those induced by the
monetary policy response to the same shock.
It is well known that VARs, because of their reduced form nature, are incapable of disentangling
these two effects. In line with the rest of the structural VAR literature, therefore, what we label
as monetary policy shocks are not the result of the implementation of the average rule followed
by the central bank when reacting to macroeconomic developments. They are, instead, the
unpredictable deviations of monetary policy from the average rule implicitly followed in the
sample period (see also Section 6.3).
3
5.4 Long run restrictions and confidence intervals
Long run restrictions have been criticized on the grounds that they only give reliable results
under very restrictive conditions (Faust and Leeper, 1997). The main criticism is that the
coefficients of the matrix  () 1 A  – on which the long run restrictions depend – are imprecisely
estimated when only weak restrictions are imposed on the dynamics of the underlying VAR
model. Although obviously momentous, this drawback has to be weighted against the fact that
long run restrictions tend to have a sounder theoretical basis. For this reason, we believe that
they remain particularly appealing. As discussed by Faust and Leeper, adopting them amounts to
imposing that the model driving the data is a VAR with known maximum lag order.
A more general problem concerns confidence intervals. For structural VARs identified through
short-run restrictions, Kilian (1998) shows that intervals based on asymptotic theory are
strongly biased in small samples, especially when the variables included in the VAR display a high
degree of persistence. Since our analysis is characterized by both a short sample and highly
persistent variables, these findings are particularly relevant and led to resort to a small sample
Bayesian Monte Carlo procedure
4 and, as suggested by Sims and Zha (1995), to present the
results in terms of percentile intervals instead of intervals based on mean and standard errors.
This modification is designed to avoid imposing symmetry on the small sample distribution of the
responses.
5
Faust and Leeper (1997) also argue that these procedures present additional problems when
applied to structural VARs identified with long run restrictions. The imprecision in the estimates
of the long run parameters implies that type II errors are more likely in constructing confidence
intervals. This problem is clearly related to the general critique of long run restrictions. In order
3 The general suitability of structural VARs to accurately capture monetary shocks has been questioned by Rudebusch (1996). The main
argument is that, in the USA, monetary shocks identified through structural VARs are little correlated with those that can be obtained
comparing future and spot Federal Funds rates. The latter would provide a good benchmark for monetary surprises, because they are
widely interpreted as such in financial markets and do not incorporate systematic forecast errors. Sims (1996) has questioned the view that
forecast errors implicit in Federal Funds futures represent a correct measure of monetary policy innovations: the reason being that they
necessarily confuse forecast errors for variables that influence policy with forecast errors for policy itself. Bagliano and Favero (1997) show
that impulse response analyses obtained using the alternative definitions of monetary policy innovations do not substantially differ from each
other.
4 The adopted Monte Carlo procedure is provided with the RATS package. For a discussion on the correct way to calculate asymptotic
confidence intervals in structural VAR with long run identifying restrictions see Vlaar (1998).
5 Kilian (1998) has proposed an alternative method (dubbed bootstrap-after-bootstrap), designed to correct the small sample bias of the
estimated parameters of the VAR. Both its proponent and Sims and Zha (1995), however, present evidence showing that the bootstrap-
after-bootstrap method performs very similarly to percentile-based Monte Carlo integration.ECB Working Paper No. 2 • May 1999 11
to deal with it, relatively wider probability bands (68%) are considered. The intervals reported in
the figures are therefore based on empirical 16
th and 84
th percentiles taken from 1000
replications.
6 A structural characterization of the union-wide economic system
This Section discusses the results based on the longest available sample (78q1- 97q4) focusing on
the impulse responses of the key macroeconomic variables to the structural shocks driving the
AD/AS model. The exposition is organized considering the effects of each shock in turn and
comparing the responses with those for the US, as characterized in Galí (1992), as well as with
the ones for the four largest European countries — Germany, France and Italy — as obtained by
Gerlach and Smets (1995, henceforth GS). The decomposition of forecast error variance is also
presented.
6.1 Supply shocks
The first column of Figure 3 depicts the response of the Union-wide economic system to a
negative, one-standard-deviation shock to aggregate supply. The initial fall of output by nearly 0.4
percentage points is followed by an uneven return to the baseline: the steady state output loss
of about 0.6 percentage points is reached after approximately two years. The responses to a
supply shock in Germany, France and Italy reported by GS reveal similar patterns, although with
a larger steady-state effects. Comparison with the response to a supply shock of the US
economy lends support to the ‘Euro-sclerosis’ view in that the US system reacts more promptly
and vigorously — 0.7 percentage points in the first period, 1.1 in steady state with a peak
around that value after one year, according to estimates of Galí (1992).
The lower impact effect on output in Europe is mirrored by a stronger effect on prices,
consistently with the evidence by GS: prices rise by almost 0.2 percentage points, against a value
of approximately 0.1 in the US. The subsequent behavior of inflation in Europe is however much
more persistent: after 5 years, inflation does not return to the baseline in Europe, whereas one
year is sufficient in the US.
Similar across the two sides of the Atlantic appears, instead, the minimal response of nominal
interest rates, consistently with the view that monetary policy reacts to a real shock with an
adjustment of money supply at unchanged nominal interest rates. This results is in contrast with
the GS findings of a much stronger interest rate response, such as to outweigh the effects on
inflation leading to a rise also in the real rate.
Regarding the decomposition of forecast error variance, another similar finding is that supply
shocks account for most of output variability (Table 4). An interesting difference can however be
detected from the pictures: in the US, the influence of supply shocks on output appears constant
or increasing as the forecasting horizon lengthens; in Europe, other shocks start having a
stronger, even if still minor, impact after approximately 6 quarters. Supply shocks have a
negligible effect on the nominal interest rate, but a strikingly high one on inflation.
6.2 Real demand (IS) shocks
The second column of Figure 3 reports the response to an expansionary, one-standard-deviation
impulse to aggregate demand. The shock increases GDP by 0.3 percentage points on impact andECB Working Paper No. 2 • May 1999 12
up to a maximum of approximately 0.5 percentage points after 3 quarters, a smaller reaction
than in the US, according to the findings in Galí.
A more interesting difference arises regarding the behavior of the other variables. The increase
in inflation determines an interest rates hike in both the US and the Union as a whole; however,
the increase is more marked in Europe, where it leads to a rise increase in real rates already
after 3 quarters, than in the US, where real rates never become higher than in the baseline. The
prompt reaction of European monetary policy appears to bring about a progressive reduction of
the inflation rate, while this remains at a higher long-run level in the US.
Demand shocks are the main cause of inflation volatility, especially at the business cycle
frequency.
6.3 Monetary shocks
The pattern of responses of the Union-wide economic system to monetary disturbances is to be
assessed with particular caution since the change in policy regime brought about by the
introduction of the single currency is likely to exert a more pronounced influence on this aspect
of the economic system. Moreover, the introduction of the single currency will be such a
momentous institutional event as to make untenable the following argument — often put
forward, in the wake of Sims (1982), to support the validity of the VAR approach. When the
monetary-policy rule is modified, agents may not distinguish the change from a random shock
and, accordingly, maintain the same behaviour; eventually, the shift in policy regime would be
noticed, affecting the private sector, but if the authorities return to the previous rule before
such changes take place, the view that the variation in policy is random is justified from the
perspective of market participants.
On the other hand, Monetary Union is such a radical development from an institutional point of
view that economic agents may find it difficult to anticipate the behaviour of the new monetary
authority with any reasonable degree of confidence. Therefore, rather than adapting to their
initial perception of the new rule, for a time they may countinue to behave as they used to until
they learn more about the money-supply rule. If this were the case, the characterization of
response of the Union-wide economic system to a shock in the supply of money may be valid
also for some time after the introduction of the single currency.
A one standard deviation monetary shock corresponds to a 10 basis points fall in the interest
rate (third column of Figure 3). The size of the monetary shock appears small with respect to
the existing evidence for both the US (approximately 50 basis point) and the main European
countries (up to a whole percentage point in Italy). The shock is however well identified and
persistent for 6 to 8 quarters, when it is eventually reversed to match the rise in the inflation
rate.
The impulse responses to monetary shock are again consistent with the evidence available for
the US. As in Galí (1992), the real interest rate initially falls together with the nominal rate; its
effects on aggregate demand however take time to materialize. The response of output takes
nearly 2 years to unfold, with a maximum increase of its level of 0.4 percent with respect to the
baseline. In line with the ‘Eurosclerosis’ view, the effect on output is more persistent in the
Union-wide economy, where the return to the baseline is not completed after 5 years. Inflation
shows a small and short-lived rise on impact. Most of the effect of the monetary shock,
however, occurs with much longer lags through the Phillips curve: the inflation rate increases up
to 10 basis points after almost 3 years, remaining above the baseline after 5 years.ECB Working Paper No. 2 • May 1999 13
Monetary shocks account for most of the short-term variability of interest rates but they also
have an increasingly important effect on output, and especially inflation, at longer horizons.
7 An alternative specification for monetary policy
The structural characterization presented in the previous section hinges on the specification of a
single Union-wide, monetary policy rule. As discussed in Section 3, the appropriateness of this
approach may be questioned with reference to the sample used in estimation — when the
pursuit of exchange rate stability in the ERM framework at times required differentiated
monetary policy responses with the Union. This section probes into the robustness of the
empirical results obtained so far. It considers the alternative specification for monetary policy
discussed in Section 3, where Germany is explicitly assigned the role of anchor country, setting
the monetary stance for the whole area, while the other countries move their interest in the
purpose of maintaining exchange rate stability.
7.1 Identification
The implementation of the alternative characterization for monetary policy requires the
specification of a different VAR system that includes — in addition to the core Union-wide
variables growth and inflation, dy
A, dp
A — the nominal 3-month interest rate in Germany, i
DE; the
interest differential between periphery countries and Germany, i-i
DE; an exchange rate variable
taken to be the log-change of the weighted average of the exchange rates of the periphery
countries’ currencies vis-à-vis the Deutsch Mark, ds. This specification implies that the system is
driven by five exogenous forces: in addition to the disturbances to aggregate supply and real
demand, there are monetary shocks in the anchor-country as well as in the other countries, and
shocks to the exchange rate.
Identification of the larger system requires new restrictions. The customary hypothesis that only
aggregate supply shocks can have a long-run effect on output leads to two additional restrictions
in the novel specification, because also shocks to the exchange rate and to the monetary policy
in the periphery countries need to be taken into account. As in the previous system, monetary
policy shocks (this time from two possible sources) are assumed to have no contemporaneous
effect on output, implying two short-run restrictions.
In addition, the following four “new” restrictions are imposed. First, monetary shocks in the
anchor-country are assumed to have a delayed effect on prices, as well as on output — a
commonly-adopted and relatively uncontroversial assumption. Secondly, monetary shocks in the
periphery countries are taken not to have any impact on interest-rate setting on the part of the
anchor-country, at least within a quarter, in line with the notion that German monetary policy
had a larger scope of autonomy within the ERM. Thirdly, shocks to the exchange rate are
assumed to have no impact effect on the interest rate of the anchor country, consistently with
the view that the burden of adjustment to maintain stability falls with periphery countries. Finally,
area-wide, symmetric shocks to the demand for goods are assumed to have no impact effect on
the exchange rate.




DE}, these restrictions can be written
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7.2 Empirical results
The results from the estimation of the five-variable VAR allowing for a different specification of
monetary policy are presented in Figure 6 and Table 5. In general, and as expected given sample-
size and lags-length, confidence bands become much wider. The model performs worse than the
smaller one, apparently failing to provide an accurate description of the dynamics of all 5
variables in the available sample. Notably, the decomposition of forecast error variance is
difficult to reconcile with theoretical priors, since it attributes most of the explanatory power of
unexpected dynamics of all 5 variables to exchange rate and AS shocks.
In qualitative terms, however, the results are similar to those of the benchmark system discussed
above, providing further support to the reliability of the characterization of the Union-wide
economic system discussed in the preceding Section. It appears especially noticeable that the
monetary shocks identified through the two systems appear consistent with each other. Figure 7
also provides a direct comparison of the monetary shock of the VAR–3 and the ‘symmetric’
monetary shock of the VAR–5. The shocks are highly correlated (0.73) and provide a very
similar description of monetary policy actions in Europe in the EMS years.
A one-standard-deviation positive shock to aggregate supply determines an impact increase of
output of roughly the same magnitude observed in the benchmark model.  The responses of the
German interest rate and the inflation rate are also consistent with the previous results,
although the variance associated with the estimates is slightly larger. Turning to the effects within
the ERM, the supply shock determines a temporary appreciation of the Deutsch mark vis-à-vis
the other currencies, accompanied by an immediate increase in the interest differential.
The effect of a shock to the IS schedule are virtually identical to the ones of the benchmark
system in terms of both magnitude and time profile as well as of precision of the estimates. The
behavior of output, inflation and the German interest rate after a monetary shock in Germany
are analogous to the previous results, although less precisely identified. The fall in the German
rate is not entirely matched by an equal reduction in the other countries, so that the interest
differential increases temporarily bringing about a temporary depreciation of the Deutsch mark.
A one-standard-deviation shock to the exchange rate causes an impact appreciation of the
Deutsch mark of approximately half a percentage point, a third of which is immediately passed
through to the Union-wide price index. A prompt increase in the interest differential helps the
return of the exchange rate to the baseline and the reduction of inflation, while German rates
remain virtually unchanged.
An autonomous negative monetary shock in periphery countries shows as an increase of the
interest differential by less than 5 basis points, revealing the tight cohesion of monetary policies
in the ERM. Such a small increase has negligible effects on all the other variables, with the
exception of the exchange rate with the Deutsch mark depreciating on impact by almost 0.8
percentage points.
8 Conclusions
This paper has attempted a characterization of the EMU-wide economic system relevant to the
monetary policy decisions of the European Central Bank on the basis of a VAR model identified
with restrictions drawn from economic theory. Any method to gauge the effects of the single
monetary policy on the basis of past data and behaviour is beset with methodological difficulties,ECB Working Paper No. 2 • May 1999 15
particularly in view of the fact that the introduction of the single currency is such a momentous
institutional change that it is likely to alter private sector economic behaviour deeply and
pervasively. On the other hand, the assessment of the effects of the single monetary policy — an
unavoidable prerequisite to define the appropriate interest rate level for the euro area —
cannot wait the availability of sufficiently long euro-wide macroeconomic time series.
The key features of the euro-wide economic system can be summarized with reference to the
response of inflation and interest rates to a one-standard-deviation shock to output aggregate
supply, aggregate demand for goods and the money market. In line with widely-held priors from
economic theory, a negative supply shock presses growth, rises inflation and triggers only a
minimal reaction of short-term real interest rates. Although such responses are qualitatively the
same as those found in the United States (e.g. by Gali, 1992), the magnitude is definitely smaller,
lending support to the ‘Eurosclerosis’ view of an inferior flexibility of the European economies.
This assessment is confirmed by the finding that a positive real demand shock increases output
and inflation in the euro-area by less than it does in the US. Finally, the response of output and
inflation to monetary shocks is, respectively, less and more persistent than in the US.
Such key features are confirmed by the additional econometric exercises carries out to test their
robustness: the estimation of the model over a shorter period (up to the inception of the 1992-
93 ERM crises) to consider possible parameter instability and the investigation of a different
specification that defines two distinct monetary rules within the Union so as to take into account
the anchor role played by Germany within the ERM — an issue that will become irrelevant in
EMU but may be regarded as crucial in modeling monetary policy within the ERM framework.
The reasonable results obtained, both in qualitative and quantitative terms, and in their
robustness to the alternative specification of the model support the authors’ hope that this work
can provide a useful starting point for the research aiming at answering the question ‘What does
the single monetary policy do?’ECB Working Paper No. 2 • May 1999 16
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Appendix — Data description
In our analysis we consider real GDP, consumer price indices and the 3-month interbank
interest rate. The frequency of observation is quarterly and the series are seasonal adjusted.
Because of data constraints, the EMU is actually constructed as an aggregate of 7 countries: the
11 participating minus Finland, Ireland, Luxemburg and Portugal.
The aggregate series are constructed as geometric weighted averages. Thus, for any given series









A x w x .
National data were all obtained from the BIS databank, with the exception of the Italian
interbank rates (source: Banca d’Italia).
The following weights were used: Austria, 3.2%; Belgium, 4.1%; France, 22.8%; Germany, 31.7%;
Italy, 21.5%; Netherlands, 5.7%; Spain, 11.0%.




ADF1 PP1 ADF2 PP2
y
A –2.38601 –1.70716 –16.02132 –5.89689
dy
A –3.17916 –8.16763 ‡ –40.28626 ‡ –86.69089 ‡
i
A –3.64881 † –2.27166 –26.32399 † –8.14250
di
A –3.65106 † –5.21884 ‡ –68.83962 ‡ –39.94791 ‡
p
A –4.63539 ‡ –2.47015 –6.39216 –2.35774
dp
A –1.75574 –3.24578 –7.59428 –17.38294
i
A–dp
A –1.59983 –3.04858 –6.31941 –17.80246
TABLE 2







A –0.0002 0.4351 1.0000
* A time trend and 4 lags are included in the OLS regressions for all variables. Sample period: 1978:1-1997:4. Critical values are: 5%=–
3.466, 1%=–4.076 for the  t ˆ  statistic and 5%=–20.5, 1%=–26.9 for the  ( ) T T r ˆ 1-  statistic. Keys: ‡, significant at the 1% confidence level;
†, significant at the 5% level.ECB Working Paper No. 2 • May 1999 20
TABLE 3







A –0.0314 0.3926 1.0000
ds –0.0205 –0.1889 0.0015 1.0000
i-i
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A- EMU conversion ratesFIGURE 2
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